Most threshold key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) have been studied in a weak model-static corruption model or random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a threshold KEM scheme with provable security based on the bilinear groups of composite order in the standard model. We use a direct construction from Boyen-Mei-Waters' KEM scheme to obtain a threshold KEM scheme that can withstand adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) and adaptive corruption attacks. However, to achieve a higher security level, our construction does not increase overall additional size of ciphertext compare to other schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Cramer and Shoup [1] proposed the first practical public key encryption (PKE) scheme whose security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (C-CA) could be proven without depending on the random oracle model. Security against CCA is now commonly accepted as the standard security notion for public key encryption schemes. In a threshold public-key encryption a (TPKE) system [2] , [3] , each of n users holds a secret decryption key corresponding to a public key, a message is encrypted and sent to a group of decryption users, and the ciphertext can be decrypted only if at least t of decryption users (where t is the threshold) in the authorized set cooperate. Below this threshold, no information about the plaintext is leaked, even if the number of the authorized users was corrupted up to t-1, which is crucial in all applications and situations where one cannot fully trust a single person, but possibly a group of individuals. The security notions of threshold encryption are very similar to those of public-key encryption in that the notion of indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) in public key encryption corresponds to the notion of indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks in threshold encryption (IND-TCCA). However, the static adversary model or adaptive c ⃝ 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (60973159, 61070251, 61103198, 61121061, 61272534) and the NSFC A3 Foresight Program 61161140320. adversary model is a special security notion in threshold public-key encryption. In the static corruption model the adversary fixes the players that will be corrupted before the protocol starts, while in the adaptive corruption model, the adversary chooses which players to corrupt at any time and based on any information it sees during the protocol. Obviously, the notion of indistinguishability against static corruption attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks in threshold encryption(IND-SCA-TCCA) [4] is weaker than the notion of indistinguishability against adaptive(or named dynamic ) corruption attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks in threshold encryption (IND-ACA-TCCA) [5] - [8] .
Instead of providing the full functionality of the publickey encryption scheme, in many applications the communication between a sender and receiver only needs a temporary session key to encrypt a message. The key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [9] - [11] is used to transmit a randomly encrypted key from a sender to a designated receiver instead of a message. A sender runs an encapsulation algorithm to produce a random session key together with a corresponding ciphertext. This ciphertext is sent to the receiver, which can uniquely reconstruct the session key by using its secret key. In the end, both parties share a common random session key. The KEM in the threshold settings is that: each of n users holds a secret decryption key corresponding to a public key; a session key is encrypted and sent to a group of decryption users; and the ciphertext can be decrypted only if at least t decryption users in the authorized set cooperate.
The security notions of threshold KEM (TKEM) are similar to those of threshold encryption. The strongest notion is indistinguishability against adaptive corruption attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks.
In 2005, Boyen-Mei-Waters [10] proposed an IND-CCA-TKEM scheme in the standard model. However, the security reduction of [10] is loose. therefore, in the same secure level, the size of the system secure parameter of loose secure reduction will be much larger than that of tight secure reduction. In 2007, based on RSA problem, Takeru et al. [12] proposed a TKEM scheme against IND-CCA with tight secure reduction. However, the secure model of [12] is random oracle model [13] .
Historically, most threshold key encapsulation mech-anisms [10] , [12] , [14] have been studied in a static corruption model, that is, a adversary chooses which users it wants to corrupt before the scheme is setup. However, in adaptive corruption model, the a adversary could choose which users it wants to corrupt at any time. So, the static corruption model is weaker than the adaptive corruption model. In 2011, Libert and Yung [15] use the Lewko-Waters [16] dual encryption approach and bilinear group with composite orders to design a threshold decryption scheme that is simultaneously chosen-ciphertext secure under adaptive corruptions and non-interactive. However, to achieve CCA security, Libert and Yung use a onetime strong signature, so the ciphertext of their scheme is longer than schemes without one.
In this paper, based on Boyen-Mei-Waters' TKEM, and Libert and Yung's threshold decryption scheme, we construct a robust CCA threshold KEM scheme against adaptive corruption attacks with tight secure reduction in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first threshold KEM scheme that can withstand adaptive corruption attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Group with Composite Orders and Related Cryptographic Assumptions
Let G and G T be two cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 (where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes). A bilinear map e(·, ·) is a map G × G → G T such that for any generator g, h ∈ G and random α, β ∈ Z N , it satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(g α , g β ) = e(g, g) αβ .
• Non-degeneracy: If e(g, h) = 1 G T , for all h ∈ G, then g = 1 G . • Orthogonality: Let G p1 , G p2 , and G p3 denote the subgroups of order p 1 , p 2 and p 3 in G respectively. e(h i , h j ) is the identity element in G T , for any
. For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the notation G pi is the subgroup of order p i . For all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, notation G pipj is the subgroup of order p i p j .
The following assumptions on a bilinear group with composite orders will be used in this paper. For more details please refer to [16] .
Assumption 1 ( [16] ): Given a description of (N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , G, G T , e(·, ·)), as well as
Assumption 2 ( [16] ): Given a description of (N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , G, G T , e(·, ·)), a set of group elements (g,
Assumption 3 ( [16] ): Given a description of (N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , G, G T , e(·, ·)), a set of group elements (g, g α X 2 ,
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 in [16] ): If an algorithm can produce a nontrivial factor of N , then it can break Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
B. Definition of (t, n)-Threshold KEM Scheme
Let P = (P 1 , · · · , P n ) be a set of n participants. A sender wants to send a session key K to P that any t participants can recover session key K, while t − 1 participants cannot acquire any information about session key K. A (t, n)-threshold KEM scheme consists of the following six algorithms:
• Setup(Λ, t, n): Takes as input a security parameter Λ, decryption threshold t, and a number of decryption participants n. It outputs a set of parameters (P K, SK, VK), where P K is the public key, SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) and VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) are the corresponding decryption keys and verification keys, respectively. The ith participant is given the decryption key share (i, SK i ). • Encapsulate(P K): The algorithm randomly selects a secret k ∈ Z N , then outputs the ciphertext C and the session key K. • CiphertextVerify(P K, C): Takes as input the public key P K and ciphertext C. It checks whether C is a valid ciphertext with respect to P K. • PartialDecapsulate(P K, SK i , C): Takes as input the public key P K, a ciphertext C, P i 's decryption key SK i . It outputs a partial decapsulation share µ i of the ciphertext C, or a special symbol (i, ⊥). • ShareVerify(PK, VK, C, µ i ): Takes as input the public key P K, verification keys V K, as well as a ciphertext C and partial decapsulation share µ i . It checks whether µ i is a valid partial decapsulation share with respect to V K. It outputs valid or invalid. • Reconstruct(P K, VK, C, Ω): Takes as input the public key P K, verification keys VK, as well as a ciphertext C, and a list of t partial decapsulation shares, denoted by Ω = (µ 1 , . . . , µ t ), without loss of generality. It outputs a session key K or ⊥.
Let (P K,SK,VK) be the output of the Setup(n, t, λ). We require the following two consistency properties: 1) For any ciphertext C generated by the Encapsula-
, then we require that Reconstruction(P K, VK, C, Ω)=K.
C. Security Model
For any ciphertext C associated with a session key K, any collusion for which fewer than t participants cannot learn any information about the session key K. Following [4] [10] [14] , we further formally define the security of threshold KEM against IND-ACA-TCCA (adaptive corruption attacks, chosen ciphertext attacks), under the classical semantic security notion, and using the following game between an adversary A and challenger C. Both are given as input n, t, and a security parameter Λ.
• Init: The challenger C runs Setup(n, t, Λ) algorithm to obtain the set of parameters P K, SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ), and VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ). It gives P K, VK to the adversary A. • Phase 1: The adversary A adaptively issues the following queries: Corruption query: The adversary A adaptively issues a decryption key share query of a participant depending on the results of previous attacks. If the adversary A wants to query the ith decryption key, the challenger C forwards the corresponding decryption key SK i to adversary A. No more than t − 1 decryption key shares can be obtained by A in the whole game.
DecapsulationShare query: The adversary A adaptively issues DecapsulationShare query with
The challenger C runs the PartialDecapsulate algorithm with C and SK i , and forwards the resulting partial decapsulation share of the P i to adversary A. • Challenge: The challenger C picks a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and runs the Encapsulate algorithm to obtain (C * , K 0 ), and randomly chooses an ephemeral key K 1 . Challenger C then gives (K δ , C * ) to the adversary A. • Phase 2: The adversary A makes further queries as in Phase 1, but it is not allowed to make Decapsu-lationShare query on the challenge C * . • Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess δ ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if δ = δ ′ .
Let Adv IN D−ACA−T CCA
A,n,t denote the probability that A wins the game when the challenger C and adversary A are given n,t as input.
We say that a TKEM is CCA security if for any n and t, where 0 < t ≤ n, and the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the advantage
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The algorithms of our (t, n)-threshold KEM scheme are specified as follows:
• Setup(Λ, t, n). Given the parameter λ,t,n, this algorithm does the following: 1) Select bilinear groups (G, G T ) of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 (where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes and
3) Select a collision-resistance hash function H :
where t is the value of threshold, and a j ∈ Z N , for j = 0, · · · , t − 1, and α = a 0 ̸ = 0), and compute the decryption key share
can be obtained taking a generator of X p3 and raising it to random exponent modulo N ); 5) Publish the public key to be P K = (G, G T , N, g, u, v, X p3 , e(·, ·), H, e(g, h) α ) and the verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) on the system bulletin board (BB). The decryption key SK i is privately given to P i , for i = 1, . . . , n; 6) The secret parameters are (h, α, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ).
• Encapsulate(P K). Given the P K, this algorithm first picks k∈ R Z N and computes
where τ = H(c 1 ). The complete encapsulated key, C is the two group elements (c 1 , c 2 ). The session key, K = e(g, h) αk , is calculated and kept secretly by the sender. • CiphertextVerify(P K, C). Given C = (c 1 , c 2 ) and P K, any verifier first randomly picks two distinct elements g 3 , g ′ 3 ∈G p3 and checks whether or not
is correct, where τ = H(c 1 ). • PartialDecapsulate(P K, C, SK i ). Given the public key P K and an encapsulated key C = (c 1 , c 2 ), the participant P i returns 0 if CiphertextVerify(P K, C) is not correct. Otherwise, it randomly picks
where τ = H(c 1 ). Then participant P i can send µ i = {µ i1 , µ i2 } to the combiner through secure channels. • ShareVerify(PK, VK, C, µ i ). The combiner verifies whether µ i = {µ i1 , µ i2 } generated by the ith participant is valid, as follows. It first computes τ = H(c 1 ), then checks whether or not
is correct. If so, the algorithm outputs valid. Otherwise it outputs invalid. • Reconstruct(P K, V K, C, Ω). The session key is reconstructed from Ω = (µ 1 , . . . , µ t ), a list of t partial decapsulation shares of an encapsulated key C = (c 1 , c 2 ), as follows. The combiner first verifies that C and t partial decapsulation shares are valid, then computes
Finally, the combiner uses (c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 ) to reconstruct session key K as follows:
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Correctness
The consistency of equation (1) is given by
. The consistency of the equation (2) is given by
The consistency of the equation (3) is given by
V. SECURITY
Theorem 1: The scheme is IND-ACA-TCCA secure against adaptive corruptions attacks if Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and Assumption 3 hold simultaneously, and H is a collision-resistant hash function in the standard model.
Proof: We prove the security by a hybrid argument using a sequence of games. The first game, Game 0 , is basically identical to the IND-ACA-TCCA game in the standard model, and the adversary A's advantage is defined accordingly. In the last Game, Game 6 , the adversary will still have to guess a given bit. But in this last game, the challenger C first performs the Encapsulate algorithm to acquire (K, C * ), and selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and two random session keys K 0 , K 1 , then sends (C * , K δ ) to the adversary A. So |Pr[δ ′ = δ]| must be exactly 1/2. To go from the first game to the last, we define various intermediate games. According to the method of proofing sequence of games [17] , each Game i must be very similar to Game i−1 , that is, the advantage of A in Game i will be bounded away from its advantage in Game i−1 by at most a negligible quantity. Let g 2 and g 3 denote a generator of the subgroup G p2 and G p3 , respectively.
• Game 0 : We now define a game, Game 0 , that is an interactive computation between a challenger C and adversary A. This game is simply the usual IND-ACA-TCCA game, in which C provides the adversary's environment.
-Init : C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the description of P K = (G, G T , N, g, u, v, X p3 , e(·, ·), H, e(g, h) α ), M SK = (h, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ), and picks a polynomial f (x) = α + a 1 x + . . . + a t−1 x t−1 to compute P i 's decryption key share SK i = h f (i) Z 3,i and verification key V K i = e(g, SK i ), for i = 1, . . . , n, where Z 3,i ∈ R G p3 . C gives the public key P K and verification key VK = {V K 1 , . . . , V K n } to A. -Phase 1: A can adaptively issue a "Corruption query" and "DecapsulationShare query." Corruption query : If A wants to corrupt P i , C just gives the decryption key share SK i to A. No more than t − 1 decryption key shares can be obtained by A in the game 0 . DecapsulationShare query: Received (P i , C = (c 1 , c 2 )) from A, the challenger C checks whether C is well-formed according to the equality (1). If so, C randomly picks
3i , where τ = H(c 1 ), and sends the partial decapsulation share µ i = (µ i1 , µ i2 ) to A. Otherwise, C gives a random value to A. -Challenge: Once A ends the Phase 1, C can form the following challenge information. C randomly selects k ∈ Z N , and computes C * = (c * 1 = g k , c * 2 = (u τ v) k ), K 0 = e(g, h) αk , where τ = H(c 1 ). With this, C now selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and a random session key K 1 . C then sends (C * , K δ ) to A. -Phase 2: A continues to issue further Corruption query and DecapsulationShare query as in phase 1, but it is not allowed to make DecapsulationShare query on the challenge C * . -Guess: Eventually, A outputs a guess bit δ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for δ. Since Game 0 is identical to the IND-ACA-TCCA game, we have
and our goal is to prove that this quantity is negligible.
• Game 1 :This is the same as Game 1 , except that the challenger will reject all decryption queries that c 1 ̸ = c * 1 and H(c 1 ) = H(c * 1 ). • Game 2 : This is identical to Game 2 , except the challenger will refuse all decryption queries that H(c 1 ) ̸ = H(c * 1 ) and H(c 1 ) = H(c * 1 ) (mod p 2 ). • Game 3 : This is the same as Game 2 , except that in the phase 2, C will abort if A manages to make PartialDecapsulate query (P i , C = (c 1 , c 2 )) such that the C = (c 1 , c 2 ) can pass the CiphertextVerify algorithm and for which c 1 = c * 1 and c 2 ̸ = c * 2 . • Game 4 : This is the same as Game 3 , with one difference in the Challenge phase that C randomly selects (k, ω, ζ) ∈ Z 3 N and generates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ). The challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 ) is well-formed according to verification equation (1) . To verify this, we observe the correctness as follows:
So, we have e(c * 2 , gg 3 ) = e(c * 1 , (u τ * v)g ′ 3 ). • Game 5 : This is identical to Game 4 with one difference of DecapsulationShare query on (P i , C = (c 1 , c 2 )) in phase 1. C randomly selects (γ, ι, ζ) ∈
, and answers the Decapsula-tionShare query of P i about c 1 , c 2 as follows: H(c 1 ) . The partial decapsulation share (µ i1 , µ i2 ) is well-formed according to equation (2) . To verify this, we can see the correctness as follows:
• Game 6 : This is the last game, identical to Game 5 , but in the challenge phase the challenger C first performs the Encapsulate algorithm to acquire (K, C * ), and selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and two random session keys K 0 , K 1 , then sends (C * , K δ ) to the adversary A. . First observe that, as desired, the adversary A's view in Game 6 is identical for either choice of δ ∈ {0, 1}, but K δ is never related to C * in the experiment, so |Pr[δ ′ = δ]| is exactly 1/2. Claim 1: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 1 from Game 0 with advantage ϵ. Then there is a distinguishing algorithm D with advantage ϵ in finding a collision of the hash function H.
If A can distinguish Game 1 from Game 0 , D will find the collision of the hash function H. Because hash function H is collision-resistant, we conclude that this event happens with negligible probability, as desired.
Claim 2: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 2 from Game 1 with advantage ϵ. Then there is a distinguishing algorithm D with advantage ϵ/2 in breaking Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
Proof. If A can produce C = (c 1 , c 2 ) such that τ ̸ = τ * (mod N ) and τ = τ * (mod p 2 ), where τ = H(c 1 ), τ * = H(c * 1 ), D can find a non-trivial factor of N by computing gcd(τ − τ * , N ). According to Lemma 1, D can break Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 with advantage ≥ ϵ/2 ( proof is similar to Lemma 1 of [16] ).
Claim 3: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 3 from Game 2 with advantage ϵ. Then there is a distinguishing algorithm D with advantage ϵ in breaking Assumption 1.
The only situation is when A issues a partial decapsulation share extraction oracle with a valid ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) such that c 1 = c * 1 and c 2 ̸ = c * 2 . Since e(g, c 2 ) = e(gg 3 , c 2 ) = e(c 1 , u τ vg ′
, this means that the difference between c 2 and c * 2 is that c 2 has a non-trivial component in G p2 , but c * 2 has no non-trivial component in G p2 (equation 1 rules out the existence of a G p3 component in c 2 ). So the relationship between c 2 and c * 2 is that c 2 = c * 2 · X 1 X 2 , where X 1 is an element in G p1 and X 2 is an element in G p2 . Since e(g, c 2 ) = e(g, c * 2 · X 1 X 2 ) = e(g, c *
2 )e(g, X 1 )e(g, X 2 ) = e(g, c * 2 )e(g, X 1 ), this mean that e(g, X 1 ) = 1 G T , but g ̸ = 1 Gp 1 , so, we can conclude that X 1 = 1 Gp 1 . D calculates ξ = e(T, c 2 )/e(T, c * 2 ).
Claim 4: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 4 from Game 3 with advantage ϵ. There is a distinguishing algorithm D with advantage ϵ in breaking Assumption 1. Proof. D begins by taking an instance (G, G T , N, e, g, X 3 , T ) of Assumption 1. We now describe how it "interpolates" between Game 3 and Game 4 with A using these parameters.
Init. D first selects a collision-resistance hash function H : G → Z N , four random integers a, b, c, α ∈ Z N and a random polynomial f (X) of degree t − 1 such that f (0) = α. Then it computes g = g, u = g a , v = g b , h = g c , X p3 = X 3 , e(g, h) α , and P i 's decryption key
Even though D knows everyone's decryption key share, it cannot distinguish T ∈ G p1p2 or T ∈ G p1 . Phase 1. This phase is identical to phase 1 of Game 3 . Challenge. Once the adversary A ends Phase 1, D can generate the challenge ciphertext as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ). D now selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and random session key K 1 . D then sends (C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 ), K δ ) to A. Phase 2. This phase is identical to phase 2 of Game 3 . Guess. A outputs a guess bit δ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for δ. If T ∈ G p1 , there exists a number k ∈ Z N to satisfy T = g k , and D correctly simulates Game 3 . To verify correctness, notice that we rewrite c * 1 , c * 2 as follows:
If T ∈ G p1p2 , there exist two numbers k, ω ∈ Z N to satisfy T = g k g ω 2 , and D correctly simulates the Game 4 . To verify correctness, observe that we rewrite c * 1 , c * 2 as follows:
Claim 5: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 5 from Game 4 with advantage ϵ. Then there is a distinguishing D with advantage ϵ in breaking Assumption 2. Proof. D begins by taking in an instance (G, G T , N, e, g, X 1 X 2 , Z 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T ) of the Assumption 2. We now describe how it effectively "interpolates" between Game 4 and Game 5 with A using these parameters.
Init. D first selects a collision-resistance hash function H : G → Z N , four random integers a, b, c, α ∈ Z N and a random polynomial f (X) of degree t − 1 such that f (0) = α. Then it computes g = g, u = g a , v = g b , h = g c , X p3 = Z 3 , e(g, h) α , and P i 's decryption key
Phase 1. This phase is identical to Phase 1 of Game 4, with one difference in the DecapsulationShare query in that D chooses two random W 3 , W ′ 3 ∈ G p3 and generates the partial decapsulation share of P i with (c 1 , c 2 ) as follows:
Challenge. Once the adversary A ends Phase 1, D can generate the challenge ciphertext as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ). D now selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and a random session key K 1 . D then sends (C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 ), K δ ) to A. There exists (k, ω) ∈ Z 2 N such that X 1 = g k and X 2 = g ω 2 , and we rewrite (c * 1 , c * 2 ) as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ) and ζ = aτ * + b. So, the form of (c * 1 , c * 2 ) is the same as that of Game 4 's. Phase 2. This phase is identical to the phase 2 of Game 4 .
Guess. A outputs a guess bit δ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for δ. If T ∈ G p1p3 , there exists two numbers β, ι ∈ Z N to satisfy T = g β g ι 3 , and then D correctly simulates the game 4 . To verify correctness, notice that we rewrite µ i1 , µ i2 as follows:
and then D correctly simulates the game 5 . To verify correctness, notice that we rewrite µ i1 , µ i2 as follows:
If A can distinguish Game 5 from Game 4 with advantage ϵ, D uses the output of A to decide whether or not T ∈ G p1p3 with advantage ϵ.
Claim 6: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can distinguish Game 6 from Game 5 with advantage ϵ. Then there is a distinguishing D with advantage ϵ in breaking Assumption 3. D begins by taking in an instance (G, G T , N, e, g, g α X 2 , X 3 , g β Y 2 , Z 2 , T ) of the Assumption 3. We now describe how it effectively "interpolates" between Game 5 and Game 6 with A using these parameters.
Init. D first selects a collision-resistance hash function H : G → Z N , three random integers a, b, c ∈ Z N and a random polynomial f (X) of degree t − 1 such that f (0) = 1. Then it computes g = g, u = g a , v = g b , h = g c , X p3 = X 3 , e(g, h) α = e(g α X 2 , h), and P i 's decryption key share SK i = (g α X 2 ) cf (i) Z 3,i and verification shadow V K i = e(g, SK i ), for i = 1, . . . n, where Z 3,i ∈ R G p3 . Finally, D sends P K = (G, G T , N, g, u, v, X p3 , e(·, ·), H, e(g, h) 
Phase 1. This phase is identical to Phase 1 of Game 5, with one difference in the DecapsulationShare query in that D chooses three random numbers γ, ζ, ξ ∈ Z N and generates the partial decapsulation share of P i with (c 1 , c 2 ) as follows:
N , to verify the correctness, notice that we rewrite µ i1 , µ i2 as follows:
where V 3 = g σζ 3 and V ′ 3 = g σξ 3 . The form of µ i1 , µ i2 is the same as with Game 5 's.
Challenge. Once the adversary A ends phase 1, D can generate the challenge ciphertext as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ). D now selects a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and random session key K 1 . D then sends (C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 ), K δ ) to A. To verify the correctness of (c * 1 , c * 2 ), we assume that Y 2 = g ω 2 , where ω ∈ Z N , and rewrite (c * 1 , c * 2 ) as follows:
where τ * = H(c * 1 ) and ζ = aτ * + b. Phase 2. This phase is identical phase 2 of Game 5 . Guess. A outputs a guess bit δ ′ ∈ {0, 1} for δ. If T = e(g, g) αβ , D correctly simulates the game 5 , since K 0 = T c = e(g, g) αβc = e(g, g c ) αβ = e(g, h) αβ .
If T ∈ R G T , K 0 = T c is a random value of G T . In this case, the challenge ciphertext (c * 1 , c * 2 ) carries no information on K 0 or K 1 .
If A can distinguish Game 6 from Game 5 with a advantage ϵ, D uses the output of A to decide whether or not T = e(g, g) αβ with advantage ϵ.
VI. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our TKEM scheme with the BMW'05 TKEM and IAHS'07 TKEM schemes. The BMW'05 scheme is the provable security under the DBD-H assumption in the standard model with loose reduction. The IAHS'07 TKEM scheme is the provable security under the RSA assumption in the random oracle model with tight reduction. Neither BMW'05 nor IAHS'07 can withstand an adaptive corruption attack. Here, SM is the abbreviation of the standard model and ROM is the abbreviation of the random oracle model. In Table 1 we summarize the comparisons. VII. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we have provided a threshold KEM scheme against chosen ciphertext attacks and with constant size ciphertext that is fully secure in the standard model from some assumptions about bilinear groups with composite order. In doing so, we discovered that the static-corruption-secure Boyen-Mei-Waters KEM can be proven to be adaptive-corruption-secure if we use bilinear groups with composite order and the dual system approach of Lewko-Waters.
